Fed policy

Are Current Credit Conditions Worrisome?

In an interview earlier this week, Jamie Dimon, CEO of JPMorgan, said "banking rivals are doing dumb things" and drew parallels between current credit conditions and those in the years leading up to the 2008-2009 Great Financial Crisis. Immediately following Dimon's interview, the FDIC issued its "Quarterly Banking Profile,” which provided evidence that commercial banks are in sound shape financially, with relatively high levels of capital and fairly low loan delinquencies. Private credit has also been in the news, fueling fears of real problems. Private credit is not supervised and there are no reliable sources of data for evaluating private credit. This makes financial markets vulnerable to speculation and anecdotal evidence.

Are current credit conditions worrisome? My current assessment is that as long as the economy continues to expand, with aggregate demand growing anywhere near its recent pace, commercial bank credit is not worrisome, and credit conditions are far different than the problems and risks that characterized the pre-GFC period. If the economy were to fall into recession, resulting in a decline in business revenues and profits, credit problems would obviously emerge, but current monetary and fiscal policies suggest the probability of that outcome is low.

The rapid growth of private credit may be a problem. However, if problems exist, most likely they are largely concentrated in the debt-financed AI infrastructure buildout, and a deterioration in private credit conditions would have localized economic and financial impacts, unlike the GFC. Unfortunately, there is insufficient collected information and data to assess the situation, so understanding the scope of the credit issue must be based on specific credits, cash flows and capital of companies.

Dimon's concerns about parallels to the pre-GFC credit markets seem overstated.  Consumer and business debt and debt-service are in fairly good shape and current credit conditions and banking practices are far different than during the pre-GFC. Corporate America has been deleveraging for years, household debt remains relative low compared to disposable personal income, and commercial banks are largely well capitalized and have a better understanding of the risks in their balance sheets.

In the years leading up to the GFC, nearly the opposite unfolded. There was an explosion of mortgage debt during an unruly bubble in housing activity (national outstanding mortgages rose 75% in the years 2002-2008) driven by rapidly rising home values and excessively loose credit standards (mortgages, HELOCs, home equity loans); a proliferation of overly-complex MBS and ABS derivatives that created tranches of income-yielding securities that were widely held by banks and investors who didn't know their risks; and insufficient bank capital and lax definitions of capital held by banks. Expectations that home values would continue to rise forever were the catalyst that drove the housing and mortgage demand and loose bank credit standards and willingness to hold complex and risky MBS derivatives. There was a high degree of interconnectedness of systematically important financial institutions (SIFIs) that risked contagion.

When home prices and expectations of future values began to fall in Spring 2006, the entire mortgage market began to unravel. Collapsing values of MBS derivatives and massive mortgage defaults resulted in back-breaking losses for banks, revealing insufficient bank capital bases. Widespread uncertainties about banks' capital led to a short-term funding crisis for large banks, a dramatic spike in uncertainty and broader financial paralysis and deep economic contraction. In sum, real estate loans were at the heart of commercial banking portfolios, and the credit quality of the loans were rotten.

The most recent Federal Reserve reports on commercial bank balance sheets and household debt along with the FDIC Report show that household and business debt levels are not high relative to economic activity and disposable personal income, and banks remain healthy and well-positioned. Chart 1 shows total household debt including mortgages as relatively low as a share of disposable income while Chart 2 shows that business debt is falling as a share of GDP. Chart 3 shows the shares of consumer loans by type:  excluding the policy-induced spike in student loan delinquencies, the only concern is credit card debt where seriously-delinquencies are uncomfortably high. Chart 4 shows delinquencies of business loans:  delinquencies of commercial real estate loans have risen only modestly since the Covid-related spike in commercial real estate vacancies in big cities and remain below delinquencies of residential real estate loans. Recent indicators suggest that the problems in commercial real estate are now diminishing.

Charts 5-7 are from the recent FDIC Report: they show that banks' past-due loans and leases and charge-offs are relatively low; their reserve coverage ratio is relatively high; and their unrealized capital losses of investment securities is shrinking (banks have reduced the duration of their securities and longer-term yields have declined). The FDIC tabulation of problem banks is low. All-in-all, commercial banks are in relatively good shape.

The private credit market remains murky, except for those who are directly involved — the lenders and their sources of capital and leverage--and have access to the financials of the credits they are involved in. The lower costs and higher efficiencies of private lending that stems from lower costs of supervision and government regulatory oversight has a downside:  lack of knowledge of data and transparency. In a recent study by the Alternative Credit Council and Houlihan Lukey, Financing the Economy 2025, the private credit market is described in broad terms and includes many interviews with active private creditors, but it does not include the sufficient data to analyze and evaluate private credit.  (In a recent article I co-authored with Amit Seru, “The Fed Needs to Earn Its Independence.  Just Setting Rates Isn’t Enough,” we argued that the Federal Reserve should seek to obtain information on the credit activities of the private lenders.)

It's important to distinguish between the different kinds and structures of private credit. Some (many?) private creditors are basically making the loans that commercial banks used to make, benefiting from the lower costs of supervision, compliance and regulation. They raise private capital, leverage it with loans from commercial banks, and provide credit to borrowers at healthy spreads. They conduct credit analyses of their clients.  Presumably, the credit quality of their loans does not deviate significantly from the commercial and industrial (C&I) loans of commercial banks, although that is not ensured. Also, it is likely that most private creditors are less leveraged than banks.

Two of the largest concerns with private credit are 1) that the proliferation of private lending may be diluting the quality of the private creditors and lessening their credit standards and oversight of the loans, and 2) some private lenders have a narrow focus of their lending activities, and their lack of sufficient diversification may generate concentrations of defaults.

Currently, there's a ton of news on the rising debt used in the AI infrastructure buildout, including data centers and energy production facilities. Sorting out the corporate finances of the companies leading the AI capital spending buildout is difficult.  For many companies involved in the AI buildout, much of the capital spending on data centers and energy related buildouts has been financed with internal capital and cash flows.  More recently, however, a significant amount has been financed by debt. At the same time, the revenues and free cash flows generated by AI-related products are accelerating dramatically.  Based on standard business metrics, a snapshot of the finances of many of the largest AI firms are reasonable or even good. Several may be problematic.

The pace of implementation of AI into commerce and society is stunning. Most likely it will add materially to productivity, economic growth and profits, and will disrupt labor markets.  As with all other innovations in U.S. history, disruptions will result in some jobs lost and other new jobs created. I take a positive view of longer-run outcomes. In weighing current commentary on the labor market outcomes stemming from AI innovations, be careful in extrapolating anecdotal evidence to the entire economy, and remember the adage “bad news sells.”

As with all episodes of technological innovation in the U.S., there will be some failures among the AI innovators, and some of the providers of capital and credit will incur losses. However, in contrast to the GFC, the losses will be incurred by a narrow group of capital and credit providers and will not be pervasive and unhinge society and commercial banking. Consider an insurance company or a state pension that finances an AI project and incurs a sizable loan default or capital loss. The jarring impacts of the losses will be narrowly focused and would be relatively minor to the broader commercial banking industry. Similarly, the impacts of the large losses stemming from the Covid-initiated collapse of commercial real estate in big cities were relatively narrow and didn’t unhinge the banking industry. The private credit industry and AI require scrutiny.  A close assessment of individual company products, revenues and profits and capital spending is required. This may be a time to be cautious in private lending.  But starting with the premise that we should be fearful because it has parallels to the pre-GFC period is not particularly instructive.

Chart 1.  Household Debt Outstanding/Disposable Personal Income

Chart 2.  Non-financial Corporate Debt/GDP

Chart 3.  Seriously Delinquent Consumer Loans and Mortgages

Chart 4. Delinquencies of Business Loans

Chart 5.  Past-Due and Charge-Off Rate

Chart 6.  Bank Reserve Coverage Ratio

Chart 7.  Unrealized Losses on Bank Investment Securities

by admin_mickey

Keep an Eye on Real Wages and Hours Worked in Economy

U.S. economic growth has remained solid through most of 2025, driven by healthy gains in consumption and strong business fixed investment, particularly for the buildout of AI. This has defied the pessimists’ worries about President Trump’s misguided tariffs, clampdown on immigration and cuts in research grants to universities. The only real laggard in 2025 was the housing sector, which suffered from continuous declines in spending on construction and improvements. But that was last year and we should not expect any let up in erratic tariff policies and anti-immigrant initiatives in 2026.  

Despite these obstacles, the outlook for sustained expansion in 2026 looks favorable, and the probability for recession is low.  Current conditions are inconsistent with onsets of recession in the past.  Consider the following two items that will support aggregate demand: 1) three Fed interest rate cuts in September-December 2025 lowered the real Fed funds rate below the Fed’s estimate of the longer-run real rate of interest consistent with its dual mandate of 2% inflation and maximum employment, and the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago’s Financial Conditions Index signals loose financial conditions, and 2) fiscal policy is stimulative, as the OBBBA of 2025 extended the 2017 tax cuts and added some additional cuts (eliminating tax on income from tips, expensing of outlays for research and development) that will boost tax refunds in Spring 2026 by approximately 0.6% of disposable personal income.  In this environment, 3) business inventories are relatively low and 4) employment is well-aligned with output (GDP).  Accordingly, any slump in aggregate demand will not force businesses to cut output and/or employment in a meaningful way.

Labor market and personal income dynamics. One key trend to keep an eye on is real wage and salary incomes, a key indicator of labor market conditions and measure of consumer purchasing power. Growth in personal income from wages and salaries has decelerated to 3.8% in the year ending November 2025 (Chart 1).  That’s down from a 5.5% rise in the prior year.  At the same time, CPI inflation was 2.7% in the last two years ending November 2025.  According, the year-over-year growth in real personal disposable income from wage and salaries has receded to 1.1% in the year ending November 2025, significantly slower than its 2.8% rise in the prior year. 

This deceleration in real wages and salaries reflects primarily a combination of moderating gains in average hourly earnings (AHE) and weakness in employment.  As shown in Chart 2, AHE have moderated to 3.5% year-over-year growth from 4.1% a year earlier. The yr/yr rise in AHE will decline further in the January and February 2026 readings as the high monthly increases in Jan-Feb 2025 roll off. At the same time, establishment payroll gains have flattened significantly.  In the six months July-December 2025, employment rose a net 87,000, an average of 14k per month; in the prior six months jobs rose 497k, an average monthly rise of 82k (Chart 3).  In the prior year ending December 2024, employment rose over 2 million. 

Chart 1.  Wages and Salaries and CPI Inflation

Chart 2.  Average Hourly Earnings

Chart 3.  Establishment Payrolls

The flatter employment gains and weakening of labor markets is a product of less supply of labor and weaker demand. Trump’s clampdown on immigration has clearly constrained the supply of labor.  It has probably also dampened business demand for labor, particularly in construction and leisure and hospitality sectors.  Businesses have responded by slowing hiring while the high costs of search and hiring have reduced their layoffs. Initial unemployment claims have remained low (Chart 4). 

Chart 4.  Initial Unemployment Claims

Amid slower gains in employment and average hourly earnings, the positive in labor markets is aggregate hours worked increased 0.7% in 2025. That’s fortunate insofar as wages and salaries and disposable personal income are driven by hours worked, not employment. Importantly, stronger productivity gains have powered the solid economic growth.  During the year ending 2025Q3, productivity (private output/aggregate hours worked) in the nonfarm business sector rose 1.9% and 2.3% in the manufacturing sectors. This decided pickup in productivity reflects the continued momentum in business investment in data storage and related AI infrastructure plus production efficiencies stemming from broadening uses of AI innovations in both manufacturing and service-producing industries.

The wealth effect and rate of personal saving. Most households spend most of what they earn, so consumption will be driven largely by growth in disposable income.  In addition, the ongoing surge in household net worth, reflecting the rise in equity valuations and real estate, has lifted the propensity to spend.  In the last year, household net worth has risen 7.6% to an all-time high of $181 trillion. To put it into perspective, household net worth has risen to 7.9 times the annual flow of disposable personal income (Chart 5). The sharp increases in household net worth are adding to the flow of disposable income (through required minimum withdrawals of IRAs and private pensions and gifting and the like) and boosting consumption through the positive wealth effect--increasing the propensity to spend out of disposable income.  As a result of the sizable wealth effect, the rate of personal saving declined to 3.5% at its last reading in November 2025.  It cannot be expected to fall much further.  

Chart 5.  Household Net Worth/Disposable Personal Income

Add it all up, and consumer purchasing power, driven by employment, hours worked and average hourly earnings, are key variables to follow in 2026.  The highest probability outlook is continued expansion at a slower pace of growth.

Mickey D. Levy is a Visiting Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University and a longstanding member of the Shadow Open Market Committee

by admin_mickey